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Abstract 
 
This article examines the retirement savings behaviour of twenty-five 30-40 years olds 
automatically enrolled into a workplace pension scheme. Using qualitative interviews, the paper 
explores the interaction between savings motivation and willingness to adhere to, or deviate from, 
the pension scheme defaults. Integrating insights from different savings paradigms, including 
sociological approaches and behavioural economics, the paper highlights how social motives 
drove willingness to accept enrolment defaults. Participants’ reactions to the contribution defaults 
were motivated by a complex combination of factors including anchoring effects, the salience of 
aging, and emotional responses such as pride, uncertainty and loss aversion. The author’s main 
premise is that greater attention needs to be given to the interaction between subjective feelings 
about saving for retirement and pension scheme design. 
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The United Kingdom (UK) introduced automatic enrolment (AE) into workplace pension schemes 
in 2012 and, since then, over nine million employees have been enrolled (DWP 2017). The UK’s 
state-run earnings-related pension scheme has been discontinued and the remaining new State 
Pension pays a flat-rate pension aimed at poverty alleviation. Workplace pension schemes are 
designed to provide supplemental retirement income to the State Pension. Participation in 
workplace schemes is not compulsory: employees may opt out, and around one in ten do so (DWP 
2017). Employees also have the right to increase contributions from the minimum default, which 
is currently 5% (up from 3% in April 2019). The DWP reports that the minimum default is too low 
to provide a satisfactory retirement income for most people. But we know little about how and 
why workers decide to opt out of workplace pensions or make additional savings beyond the 
default. AE takes advantage of inertia to maintain scheme membership. The emotional bias for 
continuity—the status quo bias—acts to hinder change and discourages the auto-enrolled 
individual from opting out (Thaler and Sunstein, 2008, Hershey et al., 2007). However, critically, 
the status quo bias also impedes changes to contribution rates (Beshears et al., 2010). The challenge 
for many individuals may be in achieving retirement income objectives using a voluntary system 
that has its roots in inertia and the little-understood field of behavioural biases.  No country has 
implemented automatic enrolment on such a large scale before. With AE, the UK has launched a 
social policy experiment that has implications for the long-term well-being of millions of people.  
It is essential that we develop a better understanding of how the UK public saves for retirement in 
the context of AE. Only then can policy-makers develop a pension system best able to meet the 
public’s retirement income aspirations.  
Factors associated with low retirement savings include income (Hershey et al., 2007), age 
and gender (Foster, 2017), low levels of financial literacy (Atkinson and Messy, 2011, Lusardi and 
Mitchell, 2009), decision-making complexity, (van Schie et al., 2012),  uncertainty (Haselton and 
Nettle, 2006), social influence (Huh et al., 2014), self-esteem (Tang and Baker, 2016), salience 
(Clark et al. 2012), myopic preferences (Thaler and Sunstein, 2008), and failure of saving intention 
realisation because of inertia (Rabinovich and Webley, 2007). These various explanations are not 
mutually exclusive and the relationship and relative influence of sociological and cognitive factors 
may vary according to circumstances. However, the very fact of being automatically enrolled, and 
the associated inertia, have the potential to reinforce some of the negative motivators.  For 
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example, the initial contribution rate can become the status quo reference point against which 
future behaviour is measured. So, if someone is struggling with the complexity of deciding on a 
suitable contribution rate, having been enrolled at a default rather than being required to choose a 
contribution level themselves, may actually make implementing change more difficult (Van Schie 
et al., 2012). Although strong motivation overcomes defaults (Sunstein, 2017), we know little 
about how motives interact with the pension scheme architecture. To achieve optimal pension 
savings rates, we must first understand the antecedents of current behaviour (Tang and Baker, 
2016).  
This paper contributes to that objective by providing multidisciplinary insight from an 
exploratory study into workplace savings behaviour. It reports findings of the research question 
‘under what circumstances do middle-to-high earners adhere to, or deviate from, the enrolment 
and contribution default settings in their workplace pension scheme?’ 
 
The study on which the article is based was inspired by interdisciplinary theoretical 
approaches recognising the value of combining demographics, psychological constructs and 
behavioural variables in retirement savings models (Hershey et al. 2007, Strauss, 2007). The 
research integrates insights from different savings paradigms including sociological approaches 
and behavioural economics. The significance of the study is that it uses individual qualitative 
interviews to highlight the different motives driving behavioural responses to membership and 
contribution defaults in workplace pension schemes.  The author’s main premise is that greater 
attention needs to be given to the interaction between subjective feelings about saving for 
retirement and pension scheme design. 
 
 The influence of the pension scheme architecture 
Employers often use matching contributions to increase workplace pension participation but 
matches have also been shown to influence contribution decision-making.  The impact of matching 
contributions on savings behaviour is not uniform across income bands. At low-income levels, the 
match increases scheme participation but, at higher-income levels, it has a negative effect on 
savings because employees tend to limit contributions to the maximum match (Huberman et al., 
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2007). One reading of this behaviour is that the match is interpreted as an optimal contribution rate 
(Madrian and Shea, 2001). This match effect is problematic because the UK’s state pension is flat-
rate and higher earners need to save relatively more for retirement than lower earners to maintain 
post-retirement income parity (DWP, 2017). In the absence of employers’ matches, most auto-
enrolled individuals start saving at the initial contribution default rate (Madrian and Shea, 2001). 
Statistically significant numbers of savers adhere to default contribution levels even though, in the 
absence of auto-enrolment, they might have opted for a different rate (Beshears et al., 2009). It is 
recognised that inertia can work against increasing contributions and savers may adhere to default 
contribution levels for long periods even if these are sub-optimal (Beshears et al. 2010). 
One explanation is that individuals subconsciously attach undue attention to the numerical value 
of the default—a process known as anchoring. Anchoring is a cognitive bias where the individual 
attaches too much importance to the first piece of information that they acquire. It is 
particularly prevalent in scenarios characterised by uncertainty and involving numerical value 
assessment (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974).    
 Conscious and unconscious mental processes 
Although there is significant heterogeneity in default sensitivity, certain individuals, such as the 
young, are more likely to adhere to contribution defaults (Brown et al. 2016). Decision-making 
skills vary over the life course (Bruin et al., 2012), but, given the evidence that cognitive biases 
affect novices and experts alike (Morewedge et al., 2015), it is unlikely that relative youth is the 
main cause of adherence to defaults. However, pension researchers have long recognised a link 
between age and low retirement savings (Foster, 2017). Income constraints explain some low 
savings, as does lack of financial capability (Foster, 2017, Lusardi and Mitchell, 2009) but other 
factors may be at work such as an unwillingness to think about pensions. Adherence to a low 
pension default could simply be related to a lack of motivation to save because pensions are not 
seen as relevant (Clark et al., 2012).   
Present-day bias can explain the failure to save adequately for retirement. Individuals may 
gain greater present utility from not saving than perceived future utility from having saved 
(O’Donoghue and Rabin, 1999). A consequence of discounting future utility is that myopic 
individuals may postpone actions that, in the longer term, may prove to be utility enhancing 
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(Pietrzak and Tokarz, 2016). One may intend saving more for retirement but procrastinate because 
of the material drop in present consumption that saving would entail. Auto-enrolment is effective 
in helping overcome myopic procrastination about pension scheme enrolment but, to date, little 
has been said about its impact post-enrolment.  
Procrastinating about increasing savings rates could be a consequence of the cognitive 
costs of deviating from the default: the more complex the decision and the greater the effort 
required, the greater the likelihood of an individual opting for the default option (Bernheim et al., 
2015). Increased complexity in the decision-making process has also been demonstrated to lead to 
increased inertia. Beshears et al., (2009) claim that, although the individual may know that the 
default is sub-optimal and intend altering it, they may delay in doing so because of the complexity 
of calculating an optimal rate. Although retirement goal clarity and financial knowledge are 
explanations for some active investment decision-making (Lusardi and Mitchell, 2009) 
insufficient cognitive effort alone does not explain all default effects (Smith et al., 
2013).  Arguably, default adherence is not a dysfunctional cognitive bias as such, but a rational 
response to the complexity of an uncertain world where there is insufficient information to make 
a decision (Huh et al. 2014, Haselton and Nettle, 2006). 
Increasingly, attention is being directed to the role of emotions on financial decision-
making (Lerner et al. 2015).  Incidental emotions experienced at the time of the decision can 
influence the evaluation of outcomes causing people to behave in ways that may be inconsistent 
with their long-term preferences (Loewenstein and Lerner, 2003). Arguably, incidental emotions 
may explain time-critical decision-making such as opting out of a pension scheme following 
enrolment. Integral affect, for example, is emotion that derives from thinking about the decision 
to be made (Lowenstein and Lerner, 2003). Anticipating future feelings, such as regret or 
satisfaction, may be relevant to financial decisions involving greater reflection, such as increasing 
contributions post-enrolment. Including affect in reactions to pension scheme default architecture 
may prove a fruitful avenue of research.   
There is merit, too, in moving beyond describing default responses as decontextualized 
cognitive phenomena and examining the normative context of pension schemes (Strauss, 2007). 
Huh at al. (2014) argue that the social context can have a similar effect to actual defaults as 
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observed choices become ‘choice defaults’. One view is that there are sociological explanations 
for some default behaviour, perhaps linked to norm adherence in the workplace (Robertson-Rose, 
2018; Duflo and Saez, 2002). It may be that the environment that individuals find themselves in 
alters cognitive responses.  Robertson-Rose (2018) identifies short-term employment contracts as 
a deterrent to pension scheme enrolment and thinking about contribution adequacy. This viewpoint 
is supported by Ambrus et al. (2015) who find that subjects with constant expected income show 
less present-bias than subjects with non-constant income expectations. To advance our 
understanding in this area, it would be helpful to include subjective construal in the investigative 
framework and consider the motivations that individuals themselves feel are responsible for their 
behaviour. 
 Theoretical approach 
The existing literature contributes to our understanding that employees may see the default as a 
starting point from which to make complex investment decisions. But we should not assume that 
all pension default adherence is a product of cognitive biases such as myopia and procrastination, 
or that all default deviation is a consequence of rational utility maximisation. To develop a fuller 
understanding of individual responses to default settings in a real-world environment, we need to 
examine the problem from an alternative epistemological perspective that recognises the 
importance of sociological factors. To that end, qualitative research is a valuable tool that can help 
explore the subliminal motivations for behaviour.  A skilled interviewer can disentangle the 
complex interactions that underlie behaviour and can pursue a wider-ranging investigation than 
could readily be achieved by quantitative methods alone.  
The research project underpinning this paper sought to advance our understanding of 
retirement savings behaviour that is not comprehensively supported by existing theoretical 
frameworks. To do so, it used an alternative investigative lens. The researcher adopted an 
exploratory approach and the exploratory nature of this research is of considerable importance. 
The paper does not seek to make statistical claims about the relationship between the research 
participants and their default adherence or deviation. The aim is to present qualitative empirical 
data which can be used to develop hypotheses and to illuminate directions for further study. The 
exploratory intentions of the study should temper the reader’s response to the data. One needs to 
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be clear about the ontological position of critical realism that underlies the research. Critical 
realists believe that reality exists but that our understanding of it can only ever be imperfect and 
probabilistic because all observation is fallible and all theory is revisable (Archer et al., 2013). 
With that in mind, this article adopts a qualitative approach situated in a UK AE context and sets 
out to answer the following research question: ‘Under what circumstances do individuals on 
medium-to-high incomes adhere to, or deviate from, the enrolment and contribution default 
settings in their workplace pension scheme?’ 
 Methodological approach 
The research was designed as an embedded case study involving twenty-five employees of a single 
large publicly traded UK company. All participants had access to the same DC workplace pension 
scheme and, although work locations were spread throughout the UK, they all had access to 
identical comprehensive on-line pension scheme information (see Robertson-Rose 2016). This 
similarity in pension provision enabled the researcher to control for the confounding effects of the 
pension scheme architecture.  
Interviews took place just prior to the company introducing legislated AE in 2013. But, 
critically, for the previous seven years, the employer had been voluntarily automatically enrolling 
new employees into its DC pension scheme. Enrolment was at a default contribution rate of 3% 
(subsequent contribution increases were freely permitted and there was no upper contribution 
level). The employer matched employee contributions up to a maximum of 6%. The company also 
awarded a loyalty bonus of an additional 3% after five years’ service and a subsequent 3% loyalty 
bonus after ten years of service. Thus, a long-term employee contributing at 6% would receive an 
employer contribution of 12%.  
The embedded cases were purposively selected based upon Mill’s Method of Difference. 
The technique selects cases which are similar but where there is variation in outcome (the 
dependent variable). This approach allows the researcher to control for variables and facilitates 
cross-comparison between cases. The selection criteria for similarity was based on a theoretical 
understanding of the socio-economic explanations for differences in retirement savings behaviour. 
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Similarity was operationalised by age, income and education. Controlling for these variables 
facilitated the search for other explanations for pension contribution variation.  
The participants were invited to participate in the study having been identified from 
responses to a researcher-designed company-wide workplace survey (N=3457) (see Robertson-
Rose 2016). In addition to socio-demographic details, the survey collected information about 
propensity to save, present-day bias, assets and investment spread.  
The participants were all on middle-to-high incomes. Income is judged to be an important 
determinant of participation and contributions into workplace pension schemes. It directly 
influences retirement savings behaviour and indirectly influences psychological factors such as 
future-time perspectives (Ambrus et al., 2015, Hershey et al., 2007).  Higher earners tend to have 
greater flexibility regarding their financial decisions and, in theory, the choices that they make 
about their contributions into workplace pensions reflect their priorities rather than absolute levels 
of affordability. The salary band £27,000 to £40,000 was selected to limit interaction with state-
benefits or higher-rate tax liabilities that might otherwise influence behaviour. 
Participants were aged between 30 and 40 years, capturing those with some pension 
provision but who were still a distance from retirement. Increased age positively correlates with 
saving for retirement (Foster2019). All participants had tertiary education. Education (and 
associated financial literacy) is positively correlated with asset accumulation (Lusardi and Mitchell 
2009). The survey included a financial literacy test based upon OECD guidance (Atkinson and 
Messy, 2011) and all participants obtained a score above the UK average for financial literacy. 
The sample included 11 females and 14 males (the gender distribution reflected the firm’s gender 
balance). 
One limitation of the study is that the purposive sampling limits the generalisability of the 
findings.  As well as being higher-paid (the median gross UK salary for full-time employees at the 
time was £27,000), the participants were slightly younger than the average UK employee. They 
were also better educated and more financially literate than average. UK Higher 
education participation rates were around 25% when this cohort graduated (although are now 
higher). The findings relate only to the participants and the study cannot confirm whether the 
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behaviours identified in this group are prevalent in other populations. That said, one can make 
analytical generalisations where there is duplication of behaviours between cases. 
   Despite the socio-economic similarities, there was considerable variation in enrolment 
and contribution patterns. Eighteen participants were automatically enrolled upon recruitment (two 
opted out but one subsequently re-joined). Eight longer-serving participants joined the firm before 
its introduction of AE in 2006, of whom six actively enrolled, mostly following a period of non-
membership. (In 2013, following legislated AE, the three non-enrolled participants were 
subsequently auto-enrolled into the scheme).  Eight individuals were contributing at 3%, ten at 6% 
and one each at 5%, 7%, 8% and 9% (See Appendix). Some of this enrolment and contribution 
variation may reflect differences in career histories and informational and social network effects 
which are discussed elsewhere (see Robertson-Rose 2018). 
 Semi-structured interviews were held in six workplace cafes at locations across the UK 
and lasted approximately one hour.  The prior survey data enabled the interviewer to engage in an 
informed conversation that built upon knowledge of participants’ socio-economic background. 
Participants were asked to ‘tell the story’ of their experience of pensions and this enabled a deeper 
understanding of the motivations behind savings behaviours. Free conversation was interspersed 
with pre-prepared questions developed from pilot-study interviews, giving focus to the 
conversations and providing continuity that aided later comparative analysis. Interviews were 
recorded and transcribed. NVivo software was used to apply descriptive and pattern coding and to 
identify commonalities and differences. Coding and analysis were peer-reviewed.  Evaluation 
involved the constant comparative method, in which themes identified in the newly acquired 
interview data was compared to the existing data. Identified themes were used to inform 
subsequent questioning. In this way, the data collection and analysis developed as an iterative 
process.    
  
Research findings 
Accepting membership defaults and avoiding regret 
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A recurrent theme in the interviews was that saving into a pension was viewed as necessary. 
Participants frequently used terms such as ‘you have to’, ‘you need to’, ‘you ought to’ and stressed 
the importance of ‘doing something’ about preparing financially for retirement because ‘It’s 
important. You got to plan for the future’ (D). It was not unusual for participants to claim that they 
would have joined the pension scheme even in the absence of AE. Scheme membership was often 
justified with reference to the approval of others–usually parents or work colleagues. Several 
participants linked saving for retirement with having children because ‘it’s the right thing to do’ 
(B). Thus, the motivation to remain enrolled in the workplace pension scheme appeared to be being 
reinforced by social norms about ‘responsible’ behaviour.  
The wish to put down a marker for retirement was not restricted to participants saving at 
the minimum default - even those who had increased contributions placed greater stress on the 
importance of membership than the fund values that higher contributions would generate. For 
several participants, such as Q, it was important that, in the future, they could justify their current 
savings behaviour both to themselves and others. 
I’ve done what I need to do. Whatever happens in the future it won’t be my fault. I’ve done what I 
needed to do and if there is a great national pensions scandal or the financial system collapses or 
whatever I’ll be in the same boat as everyone else. (Q) 
Social and psychological motivations also appeared to override ‘present-day bias’ 
(O’Donoghue and Rabin, 1999). As part of the pre-interview fact-find, participants were asked to 
two questions designed to detect present-day bias. These questions were: 
  
       If I had a choice of receiving £1000 today or £1,100 in one year’s time I would choose..? 
       I would rather have a good standard of living today than save for retirement 
All the participants with present-day bias were enrolled in the pension scheme. Some stated 
that the future was low priority but that pension scheme membership was important. However, the 
emphasis was often upon the ‘act of saving’ — of ensuring that the pension ‘box was ticked’ (G), 
rather than upon actively reflecting on the financial situation they would likely experience upon 
retirement. There appeared to be a psychological benefit to moving from a non-enrolled to an 
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enrolled state, perhaps because being enrolled symbolised ‘ideal’ behaviour. But enrolment also 
removed some anxiety about not preparing for retirement. It appeared to reduce the perceived need 
to consider retirement outcomes more deeply (or at least for the time being) because, according to 
K, ‘In my head, it’s job done. I got pension, tick…  It’s job done, move on’. This sentiment was 
echoed by I ‘You just think, tick that box. I am paying into the pension then I am sorted ‘. 
Overriding rational behaviour 
The desire for pension scheme enrolment appeared to override rational economic thinking. The 
employer offered a tax-efficient share saving scheme (SIP) with an employer contribution that was 
more generous than the pension scheme’s—a two-for-one match versus a one-for-one match. A 
few participants, recognising the fungibility of assets, saw saving into the SIP as a ‘no brainer’ 
(D).  
If you are in the pension and you are not in the SIP, then you are mad. If you only have enough 
money to do one, do the SIP because you could actually use that as a pension pot (O).  
But SIP participation rates were one-third of pension participation rates. AE likely explains 
much of this difference, although this also raises questions about the negative influence of AE on 
asset accumulation noted by Huberman et al. (2007). Ditto and Tannenbaum (2011) argue that AE 
and defaults convey implicit advice. In this case, by automatically enrolling, the employer may 
have been signalling the desirability of scheme membership and reinforcing the influence of pro-
pension norms to the detriment of alternative asset accumulation. 
 Relevance of the Default Levels  
Participants were asked why they thought that the minimum employee contribution level 
in the pension scheme had been set at 3%. Several, including H, I, and N, held the view that rates 
had been set at a low level so as not to ‘put people off’ (E). They believed that, because scheme 
membership is voluntary, pension default levels needed to be low to deter the young and the low-
paid from opting out. Embedded in these participants’ thinking was an assumption that the 3% 
default was suitable for younger employees. 
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 I’m thinking of 18-year-olds or 16-year-olds. 3% at that point is probably enough to go on. (A) 
 But there is little evidence that, when making these assumptions, participants knew what 
level of pension this would provide. Opinions on the suitability of the minimum default were 
primarily driven by the voluntarism inherent in the UK system. The default was seen as good 
‘because it gives them something’ (F), and was an improvement over not saving at all. This view 
of the suitability of the default is important because some participants took an active role in 
encouraging younger employees to remain enrolled (see also Robertson-Rose 2018). The 
appropriateness of the default for younger employees is particularly relevant because of the 
elasticity of the concept of ‘younger’.  The participants were all aged over thirty but some still 
self-identified as ‘young’. These young-thinking individuals were more likely to consider current 
pension arrangements as adequate and to attach little importance to the default parameters. So, for 
example, there was a contrast between T who was contributing at 3% and said,  
I’ve just turned thirty and I really don’t want to be thirty so the last thing I want to do is sit down 
and talk about pensions. (T) 
and R who began saving at 6% because  
 I always thought that me starting a pension at twenty-five, twenty-six years of age I was already 
five or six years behind the game. (R) 
 The chronological age at which participants viewed it necessary to start saving for 
retirement and the age at which they believed it necessary to increase contributions varied 
considerably. This appeared to reflect their perceptions of where they were in the life course, and 
whether they had dependants or elderly parents.  
 Antecedent preferences  
Strong antecedent preferences are linked to default deviation (Sunstein, 2017). But this study also 
suggests that, in addition to inertia and status quo bias, strong current preferences, particularly in 
relation to children and housing security, are implicated in keeping pension contributions to default 
levels. Once membership had been achieved, whether additional resources were allocated to the 
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pension scheme depended on where future income security fitted into priorities. Indeed, it could 
be argued, that some were active in accepting the contribution default set by the scheme 
architecture. They knew it was ‘nowhere near enough to be comfortable on a month’ (I) but still 
did not want to increase the amount at their current life stage. Many participants had higher 
priorities than securing a generous retirement income and were unwilling to restrict experience-
related spending, particularly if these experiences might not be available in the future. Although 
there was evidence that having dependants acts as a driver for both thinking about pension scheme 
enrolment and contribution increases (because of an unwillingness to burden dependants), having 
children also curtailed additional saving. A few participants had reduced working hours to spend 
more time with their children. Irrespective of affordability issues, pensions were a lower priority 
than the desire not to miss out on child-related opportunities. The conflict between enjoying life 
now and avoiding future regret at not having saved for retirement was a feature of many interviews. 
The majority of participants dealt with this internal conflict by mentally allocating future pay rises 
to their pension. Integral to this approach were assumptions about career development and future 
pay increases. Thus, behaviour that might be interpreted as myopia and procrastination had its 
roots in the avoidance of conflicting regrets and in positive illusions about the future. 
 Insecurity and Alternatives 
There was a lack of confidence that, on their own, workplace pensions could provide a satisfactory 
retirement income. But, rather than significantly increase pension savings beyond the default, there 
was evidence of intention to diversify investments across different savings vehicles (and asset 
classes) with the aim of providing multiple sources of retirement income. For example, B, G, I and 
M contributed the minimum but they also invested in their employer’s shares. Although 
assumptions about life trajectories were generally optimistic, this ‘hedging of bets’ stemmed 
primarily from uncertainty about the future. All the participants viewed homeownership as the 
cornerstone of obtaining security. Indeed, A, U, and W saw property as a more secure asset for 
retirement than workplace pensions and it was an important component in their retirement strategy.  
Aspiring homeowners attached greater priority to saving for a deposit than to increasing 
pension contributions beyond the minimum. For I, K and M, early mortgage redemption was 
prioritised over increased pension saving and O had actually reduced pension contributions to fund 
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mortgage debt redemption. Owning one’s own house debt-free was viewed as an integral part of 
managing expenses in retirement. The conversations with the homeowners revealed that there was 
an emotional response to debt: several, including H and L, expressed pride in the success they 
were having in becoming mortgage-free. Although participants had similar incomes, housing 
affordability varied considerably, but references to indebtedness were made in absolute terms and 
not as a percentage of property equity. This would suggest that the symbolism, or the social fact 
of being debt-free, was of high priority. 
 Anchoring and Heuristics 
Fourteen of the participants were contributing at more than 3%. Those individuals understood that 
contributing up to the employer match level meant they were ‘maximising their benefits with the 
company’ (C). Concerns about the sustainability of the state pension provision had motivated some 
to increase contributions but several conveyed the impression that they contributed at the higher 
level because they felt that it was expected behaviour for individuals of their age and social status. 
Thus, social norms appeared to be redefining the default rule (Huh et al. 2014) in participants’ 
minds from the minimum default to the employer’s match. But there was also evidence of the 
match restraining additional savings. Two participants misinterpreted the 6% level as being the 
maximum they were entitled to contribute and another assumed that contributions were restricted 
to multiples of three. The interviews revealed other examples of participants focusing upon the 3% 
or 6% levels. Although most understood that the minimum default would be unlikely to provide a 
generous pension for higher earners, there was a presumption amongst many that 6% was a 
‘correct’ figure. Assumptions about the inadequacy of 3% were based upon the fact that it ‘feels a 
bit low’ (E). 
Only a couple of individuals mentioned the cumulative employee/employer contribution 
i.e. 6% or 12%, when discussing the amount being credited to their pension scheme. Indeed, in 
one case, it was only during the interview that the participant recognised that in her previous 
employment (because of employer generosity) her combined contribution had been four times her 
current contribution. 
I used to pay 4% into my previous pension, so 3%, I didn’t really question it (K). 
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Even when participants recognised that projected fund values might be important, they 
appeared to be being subconsciously influenced by the scheme architecture and used three and 6% 
as reference points to determine the adequacy of their own contribution. There were numerous 
examples of the figure three being embedded in thinking: participants counting in multiples of 
three from three to six to twelve. These anchoring effects appeared to be strongest when there was 
uncertainty about the ideal contribution rate to meet retirement needs. 
 They can’t even show you that if you continue at 6%, or 3%, or 12% that at the end of your time 
this is the benefit that you will derive from it. (M) 
  
Lacking guidelines as to the correct contribution rate, participants appeared to be latching 
onto the figure of six as an improvement on three. This heuristic is very similar to the 
interpretation that 3% is better than zero contributions for younger employees.  
 A few participants actually pointed to the influence of the default on their contributions.    
Whether it’s 3% or 6%, if it’s automatic right from the start, then I wouldn’t have known any 
different.  And I would go, right, that’s what I have to work with. (G)  
 M and Y both recognised the disconnect between contributing 3% and obtaining an 
adequate pension but still appeared to be influenced by the default contribution.   
Probably if I had joined and set it at 6%, it wouldn’t have bothered me. But the fact is that it was 
set at 3%. It was a 3% thing to start with and that is what it has been. (M)  
If the default had been 6%, I would probably be paying 6% and I would just have been making do 
at that level. (Y) 
 Y expressed a frustration that she was losing the benefit of the employer’s full matching 
contribution. 
 I would prefer it to be at 6% rather than 3%. Had they put me at 6% I wouldn’t have changed it 
down, but having put me at 3% I felt as if I couldn’t justify myself to put it up. (Y) 
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There appeared to be several processes at work reinforcing the status quo bias, including 
loss aversion (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974), information failure and decision-making 
uncertainty. G’s willingness to adjust her expenditure to income (which was confirmed elsewhere 
in the interview) suggests that being made aware of the financial outcome of increasing 
contributions would have been sufficient incentive to overcome the default. But, for both M and 
Y, concern about the uncertainty of DC pensions, and the difficulty in determining an appropriate 
contribution level, reinforced their inertia. The combination of aversion to income reduction 
(which both expressed) and concern about making the wrong decision, appeared to be reinforcing 
adherence to a sub-optimal default.  
  Discussion 
The first finding that merits further comment is that the study uncovered subtly different motives 
for adhering to the pension scheme membership and contribution defaults. Enrolment was rarely 
driven by explicit financial goals. All participants, whether having actively joined the scheme or 
having been automatically enrolled, expressed normative beliefs about the desirability of 
membership. Although participants appeared to obtain utility from scheme membership, 
satisfaction levels were more strongly linked to sociological factors than financial ones. Or in the 
words of K, ‘it was more about just having a pension than the kind of pension.’ AE helps realise 
savings intention but why individuals want to save (or be seen to be saving) in the first place is of 
considerable relevance.  Van Winssen et al., (2016) suggest that anticipated future regret at having 
made no preparation for negative events is a motivator in health insurance take-up.  This study 
suggests that similar incentives exist with pensions, particularly when the individual considers the 
risk of future opprobrium. Default adherence is generally investigated from a socio-demographic 
perspective, being linked to relative youth and low education (Beshears et al. 2010). However, 
there is merit in investigating the social and psychological factors that motivate individuals to be 
complicit in accepting enrolment. One avenue of research may be the subjective meaning attached 
to membership. Arguably the act of being enrolled (or seeing colleagues enrolled) alters the 
meaning of the default option so that compliance comes to be seen as a moral act (Davidai et al., 
2012). Psychological identification with a product has been shown to increase the endowment 
effect (Morewedge and Giblin, 2015) and it is reasonable to conjecture that the same influences 
may be at play with pension scheme membership. The author hypothesises that, by saving into the 
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pension, individuals derive social value from being seen to be doing the ‘correct thing’. Pension 
savings have social utility (Beauvois, 2004) whereas saving into non-pension investment vehicles 
could be considered individualistic.  This may explain the reliance on the pension scheme, rather 
than the SIP, for asset accumulation. Such behaviour also adds support to the argument advanced 
by Beshears et al. (2009) that AE can override some individuals’ economic rationality. The 
interrelationship between pension AE and other employer-provisioned savings schemes warrants 
greater research attention.   
Low pension contributions were not always a consequence of inertia and status quo 
bias.  Individuals could be committed to saving for retirement but make active decisions not to 
commit more resources to the pension. From a long-term income-smoothing perspective, this 
appears to be sub-optimal, but not if viewed from the perspective of non-financial priorities.  It is 
inherently difficult for an observer to value utility.  But the nuanced differentiation between 
material and experiential consumption suggests that perceptions of experiential opportunity costs 
are integral to understanding retirement saving decisions. As Lowenstein and Lerner, (2003) 
maintain, emotions can be potent drivers of decision-making. This study suggests that the meaning 
that we attach to consumption matters. Although participants rarely reflected on the pension 
income their current savings would provide, it not clear whether, for some, having that knowledge 
would have significantly altered their behaviour at that stage in their lives. An individual’s present-
day preferences do not exist in isolation but coexist with an awareness of their ability to adapt to 
future circumstances. From that perspective, arguably low contributions are not simply self-
regulation failure. Nor is default adherence necessarily sub-optimal in the long run. 
The distinction between the intention to save and how much to save may be subtle but is 
important in the context of low default contribution rates. Individuals’ self-assessment of their 
relative position in the life-cycle appeared to be having some influence on the motives behind their 
behaviour.  The author hypothesises that extended tertiary education and postponed household 
formation delays self-reflection on the need to save for retirement. Given the importance of early 
saving for outcomes, the elasticity of the concept of ‘younger’ warrants further investigation.  
Another finding that merits attention is that, once scheme membership had been achieved, 
the desire for housing security and debt reduction appeared to be of greater emotional and social 
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significance to participants than increasing pension contributions. It is not unreasonable to 
conjecture that social comparison can influence default adherence. Arguably, it is easier for 
individuals to demonstrate financial competence by declaring themselves ‘mortgage-free’ than by 
increasing pension contributions. Financial literacy shortcomings might explain the preference for 
mortgage redemption over tax-efficient pension contributions. Yet the participants’ expression of 
pride in their ability to reduce their mortgages suggests that debt aversion is also relevant 
(Meissner, 2016). Emotional responses to financial planning are not generally included in financial 
planning models, although Loewenstein (1996) argues for visceral and situational features to be 
included in explanations of future-orientated decision-making. An alternative hypothesis, drawing 
on subjective construal theory (McCrea et al., 2008), is that different levels of abstractness between 
housing and pensions impact upon proactive behaviour towards contribution defaults. Reducing 
mortgage debt to zero is an easily understood goal. Achieving pension fund adequacy is much 
more abstract. The different levels of abstraction could explain the greater willingness to alter 
mortgage contributions than pension contributions. However, relying on property as a financial 
safety net in retirement carries risks such as falling house prices, changes to taxation and 
maintenance costs. A qualitative study investigating individuals’ understanding of the relative 
risks of property and pensions is recommended. 
The effects of the default and match rates in this study were illuminating, not only because 
they restricted savings, as Huberman et al. (2007) have claimed, but also because they influenced 
discussions about pension adequacy. At one level, some participants were attaching significance 
to the match heuristically—they recognised it as an employer benefit. Yet few quantified its value 
and included it in their pension adequacy calculations. And, at another level, the default and match 
subliminally inculcated themselves into how participants framed future contributions. This finding 
is important. It demonstrates the subtle effects of savings adequacy considerations being anchored 
around the default. Anchoring is particularly prevalent when there is uncertainty (Tversky and 
Kahneman, 1974) and the unpredictable outcomes inherent to DC pension schemes could be a clue 
to the strength of the observed anchoring phenomenon.  The dilemma for participants in the study 
was not that pensions require high financial literacy, but that it was impossible to calculate suitable 
contribution levels thirty years prior to retirement. Complexity around calculating pension 
outcomes appears to constrain contributions, particularly as van Schie et al. (2012) have argued 
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amongst those who believe they save inadequately. The uncertainty shifted attention to the 
accumulation of more tangible assets such as housing. Discontent with being in a suboptimal 
default could not only lead to dissatisfaction with the outcome but also appears to interfere with 
the accumulation process.  
 Reflections 
This research project used qualitative methods and took a broad exploratory approach to achieve 
its objective of furthering our understanding of retirement savings behaviour within the context of 
AE. By focusing on subjective construal, the research has revealed the different motives 
underpinning pension enrolment and contribution increases. One of the strengths of the paper is 
that its interdisciplinary approach highlights the importance of combining social, emotional and 
behavioural factors into pension saving research. The study sheds light on how the combined 
impact of pro-saving behavioural norms and AE can influence retirement savings behaviour. Given 
the participants’ narrow socio-economic background, the findings are not generalisable to the 
wider population. However, UK policy-makers can draw important lessons from the responses of 
these highly educated, financially secure individuals. It is those on average earnings that have most 
to lose in the shift from earnings-related to flat-rate state pensions and, consequently, most to gain 
from increasing workplace pension contributions beyond the default settings. The research draws 
attention to the danger of expecting individuals to increase contributions spontaneously as they 
age. An alternative approach could be to introduce automatic age-related increases in 
contributions—a suggestion supported by the work of Goda and Manchester (2013), who point to 
the welfare-enhancing effects of age-related defaults. 
 The subliminal effects of the default identified in this study are troubling. At a UK-wide 
level, the minimum default has just recently been raised to 5%. It will be years before we have 
large-scale data on the willingness of savers to shift contributions from the default. But it does 
not auger well that some study participants had been ‘stuck’ at their employer’s default level for 
over five years. A potential antidote to the stickiness of the default could be to frame workplace 
pensions as a means to replace a shortfall from the current income position, rather than focusing 
on contributions. This premise merits investigation, perhaps through a pilot study. On a positive 
note, the willingness to mentally allocate future earnings to a pension suggests that were 
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contribution accelerators to become widespread in the UK, these would be received 
positively.  Ultimately, savings vehicles that can tap into individuals’ internalised objectives, 
rather than subconscious behavioural biases, are likely to be more effective and morally more 
appropriate (Smith et al. 2013). That said, given that even the financially literate struggle with 
the complexities of DC pensions suggests that there is a need for greater education and guidance 
on pensions. There is a role here for the Government’s new Money and Pensions Service.  
To some extent, the reliance on housing as an asset class was an emotional reaction to 
insecurities about welfare provision in old age.  There needs to be a greater understanding that, 
owning one’s home outright is seen as integral to providing security in retirement.  The shift in the 
UK to viewing property as a substitute for welfare has received comment elsewhere (Lowe et al., 
2011). Both its causes and consequences in relation to planning and funding in retirement merit 
greater attention from policy-makers. The preference for using property as a savings vehicle will 
continue in the absence of state assurances about welfare provision and secure retirement income. 
Uncertainty is inherent in DC workplace pension schemes and to alter this requires radical changes 
to current decumulation policy. This is a critical point because, without assurances about reliable 
retirement income, outcome uncertainty and susceptibility to anchoring, will persist. The 
Government should consider how to inject security into the system, perhaps through encouraging 
defined ambition pensions where the risk is spread between employer and employee. An 
alternative approach could be through the provision of Government-backed annuities. 
Policy-makers need to ensure that workplace pensions provide adequate and secure 
retirement income. Automatic enrolment was introduced to the UK based on the success of 
individual employer schemes in the US. But context is important and UK citizens have different 
expectations of state support that may limit AE’s applicability as a solution to the ‘retirement 
income problem’. The decision to opt out or limit pension contributions to the default does not 
take place in a cognitive bias vacuum but is influenced by emotional responses to current economic 
and social policies. A voluntary supplementary pension system set within the context of inadequate 
housing, precarious employment and derisory elderly care is unlikely to meet the retirement hopes 
of the majority of the population.   
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APPENDIX 
 
Key to participants 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
      
Participants automatically enrolled at recruitment  
Participant 
Identifier 
Enrolled at 3%. Remained at 3%. 
 
G,I, M,S,T,Y  
Enrolled at 3%. Subsequently increased contributions to 6%. 
 
A,C,F,K, V 
Selected 6% match at enrolment.   
 
L,Q,R,E 
Enrolled at 3%. Opted-out after two years. Subsequently 
automatically re-enrolled in 2013 at 3%. 
 N 
Enrolled at 3%. Immediately opted-out. Joined several years 
later at 5%. 
 X  
Participants employed prior to automatic enrolment    
Joined after 11 years’ employment at 3%.  B 
Joined at recruitment at 3%. Gradually increased to 8%.  H 
Joined at recruitment at 3%. Gradually increased to 7%. 
 
P 
Joined at recruitment at 6%, Reduced to 3%, then increased 
to 9%. 
 D 
Joined at recruitment at 6%. Subsequently reduced to 3%.  O 
Joined after five years employment at 6%.  J 
Did not join at recruitment. Subsequently automatically 
enrolled in 2013 at 3%. 
 W 
Did not join at recruitment. Subsequently automatically 
enrolled in 2013 and selected 5% . 
 U 
      
